Archive for October, 2008

MS08-067 Update

Thursday, October 23rd, 2008

From MS:

Published: October 14, 2008 | Updated: October 23, 2008

Version: 3.0

This bulletin summary lists security bulletins released for October 2008.

With the release of the bulletins for October 2008, this bulletin summary replaces the bulletin advance notification originally issued October 9, 2008. For more information about the bulletin advance notification service, see Microsoft Security Bulletin Advance Notification.

For information about how to receive automatic notifications whenever Microsoft security bulletins are issued, visit Microsoft Technical Security Notifications.

Microsoft is hosting a webcast to address customer questions on these bulletins on October 15, 2008, at 11:00 AM Pacific Time (US & Canada). Register now for the October Security Bulletin Webcast. After this date, this webcast is available on-demand. For more information, see Microsoft Security Bulletin Summaries and Webcasts.

For the out-of-band security bulletin added to Version 3.0 of this bulletin summary, Microsoft is hosting a webcast to address customer questions on October 23, 2008, at 1:00 PM Pacific Time (US & Canada). Register now for the Out-of-Band Security Bulletin Webcast. After this date, this webcast is available on-demand. For more information, see Microsoft Security Bulletin Summaries and Webcasts.

Microsoft also provides information to help customers prioritize monthly security updates with any non-security, high-priority updates that are being released on the same day as the monthly security updates. Please see the section, Other Information.

Bulletin Information

Executive Summaries

The security bulletins for this month are as follows, in order of severity:

Critical (5)

Important (6)

Moderate (1)

Exploitability Index

Affected Software and Download Locations

Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance

Other Information

Microsoft Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool

Microsoft has released an updated version of the Microsoft Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool on Windows Update, Microsoft Update, Windows Server Update Services, and the Download Center.

Non-Security, High-Priority Updates on MU, WU, and WSUS

For information about non-security releases on Windows Update and Microsoft update, please see:

Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 894199: Description of Software Update Services and Windows Server Update Services changes in content for 2008. Includes all Windows content.
New, Revised, and Released Updates for Microsoft Products Other Than Microsoft Windows.

Security Strategies and Community

Update Management Strategies

Security Guidance for Update Management provides additional information about Microsoft’s best-practice recommendations for applying security updates.

Obtaining Other Security Updates

Updates for other security issues are available from the following locations:

Security updates are available from Microsoft Download Center. You can find them most easily by doing a keyword search for “security update”.
Updates for consumer platforms are available from Microsoft Update.
You can obtain the security updates offered this month on Windows Update, from Download Center on Security and Critical Releases ISO CD Image files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 913086.

IT Pro Security Community

Learn to improve security and optimize your IT infrastructure, and participate with other IT Pros on security topics in IT Pro Security Community.

Acknowledgments

Microsoft thanks the following for working with us to help protect customers:

NetAgent Co., Ltd. for reporting an issue described in MS08-056
Joshua J. Drake of iDefense for reporting an issue described in MS08-057
Wushi, working with TippingPoint and the Zero Day Initiative, for reporting an issue described in MS08-057
Lionel d’Hauenens of Labo Skopia, working with the iDefense VCP, for reporting an issue described in MS08-057
David Bloom for reporting an issue described in MS08-058
Gregory Rubin for reporting an issue described in MS08-058
Ivan Fratric, working with TippingPoint and the Zero Day Initiative, for reporting an issue described in MS08-058
Thierry Zoller of n.runs for reporting an issue described in MS08-058
Lee Dagon of Composica for reporting an issue described in MS08-058
Stephen Fewer of Harmony Security, working with iDefense VCP, for reporting an issue described in MS08-059
Paul Miseiko of nCircle for reporting an issue described in MS08-060
Paul Caton of iShadow for reporting an issue described in MS08-061
Thomas Garnier of SkyRecon for reporting an issue described in MS08-061
CERT/CC for reporting an issue described in MS08-062
Joshua Morin of Codenomicon for reporting an issue described in MS08-063
Cody Pierce and Aaron Portnoy of TippingPoint DVLabs for reporting an issue described in MS08-065
Fabien Le Mentec of SkyRecon for reporting an issue described in MS08-066

Support

The affected software listed have been tested to determine which versions are affected. Other versions are past their support life cycle. To determine the support life cycle for your software version, visit Microsoft Support Lifecycle.
Customers in the U.S. and Canada can receive technical support from Microsoft Product Support Services at 1-866-PCSAFETY. There is no charge for support calls that are associated with security updates.
International customers can receive support from their local Microsoft subsidiaries. There is no charge for support that is associated with security updates. For more information about how to contact Microsoft for support issues, visit International Help and Support.

Disclaimer

The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.

Revisions

V1.0 (October 14, 2008): Bulletin summary published.
V2.0 (October 15, 2008): Removed the severity rating for Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems (MS08-062).
V2.1 (October 16, 2008): Updated the Executive Summary for Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-062.
V3.0 (October 23, 2008): Added Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-067, Vulnerability in Server Service Could Allow Remote Code Execution (958644). Also added the bulletin webcast link for this out-of-band security bulletin.

Anyone have any info?

Thursday, October 23rd, 2008

There’s a lot of news going on related to MS08-067. From what I’ve seen it’s an exploit from the wild against MS Server Service over RPC. The Post has a decent write up: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/microsoft_to_issue_emergency_s_1.html

Please post comments if anyone knows anything more…

In the news…

Thursday, October 23rd, 2008

bin Laden hacked?

Posted: 01:03 PM ET
'Al-Ekhlass' A website where many of al Qaeda's jihadist messages are posted has been hacked and replaced with joker.com

‘Al-Ekhlass’ A website where many of al Qaeda’s jihadist messages are posted has been hacked and replaced with joker.com

Octavia Nasr | BIO
CNN senior editor for Arab affairs

A hacking war is raging on Jihadi websites. Radical Islamist sites have been attacking and getting attacked for quite some time. The website hacking practice was common in 2001 and 2002… Following the 9/11 attacks when al Qaeda used only one website to communicate its messages to supporters and foes alike. That website was called alneda.com. It was getting constantly hacked… sometimes several hackings a day. After every hacking the site managed to resurface on the net until it disappeared from the scene in 2004 to be replaced by other websites — What started as one al Qaeda-linked site mushroomed into dozens which branched out into hundreds of supporting sites that serve as dissemination centers over the internet.

Two well-known al Qaeda-linked sites are Al-Hesbah and Al-Ekhlaas. Al-Hesbah is the oldest and requires a username and password to access it. Its membership was open to the public in 2004 but became restricted over the years. This site became known as the first venue for uploaded al Qaeda messages — from Osama bin Laden video messages to statements and claims of responsibilities for attacks carried out in Afghanistan, Iraq or even Europe. Al-Ekhlaas followed with a sleeker image, and more technical bells and whistles.

The hacking war works both ways.
There are documented cases of extremist groups hacking into local websites that disagree with their messages. One case that drew the attention of western media took place about a month ago when a Sunni group hacked into the site of Shiite Iraqi Cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The group posted a Bill Maher clip making fun of an edict the cleric had made concerning a sexual subject. The group’s claim was that the cleric and his edicts are bringing shame to Islam and giving a good reason for the west to laugh at the Islamic religion.

Shortly before September of 2008, al Qaeda watchers started speculating about the next al Qaeda message which they expected to be released around the 9/11 anniversary — a practice al Qaeda and its video arm, As-Sahab, have been consistent about. The message never came partly because those websites were hacked into and completely disabled at times.

Today Al-Ekhlaas is off line, hacked into by joker.com. Trying to go to their site, you get a message saying that “this domain was registered with Joker.com.” Try it for yourself.

Al-Hesbah and a few other al Qaeda-linked sites remain in operation, not because they escaped hacking, but because they manage to resurrect themselves under different names and continue to post messages mainly from al Qaeda enthusiasts. So the drop in al Qaeda-released videos is evident, the lack of messages from al Qaeda leadership is obvious. What is not obvious is whether al Qaeda has decided to slow down production and release of videos or the hacking is so severe and pointed that it paralyzed the media activity of the terror group.

Vulnerability Disclosure

Monday, October 20th, 2008

Recently I was visiting the website of a company that I do business with. Somewhere in the mix, I went from their website to another website while managing my account. I found this a little odd so I investigated. In the end, I found a vulnerability in the system that definitely ought to be reported. It’s one of those things where a criminal could make lots of money from and where my data could be stolen. While the “hack” is simple and fairly benign, given the sensitivity of the matter I can’t properly report the vulnerability.

I think it’s amusing. If I report the vuln I could be reported as a criminal. However, my motive is to protect my data and to keep the criminals out. But because of the system, we’re in a paradox. Personally, this is why I’m a moral relativist rather than Kantian.

Free Ringtones

Monday, October 13th, 2008

Lovely “feature”….

Friday, October 10th, 2008

http://www.dc101.com/cc-common/ringtones/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cyberwart.com/?

News of the Day

Tuesday, October 7th, 2008

http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20081007_1366.php

Air Force pursues Cyber Command again
By Bob Brewin, bbrewin@govexec.com 10/07/08
Top Air Force leadership has decided to pursue forming Cyber Command to defend Defense Department networks and to launch cyberattacks against foes after putting the project on hold in August.

Comment on this article in The Forum.The service’s leadership, including Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz, made the decision last week at the Corona senior leadership conference in Colorado Springs, Colo., to continue its effort to stand up the command, said Capt. Michael Andrews, an Air Force spokesman.

The service put Cyber Command on hold in August, saying it wanted to delay the program until new senior Air Force leaders, including Schwartz, had time to make a final decision on the scope and mission of the command. Last month, sources said the Pentagon decided that the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Neb., should create and run a joint Cyber Command, a move that seemingly dashed any hopes the Air Force had to own Defense’s cyber responsibilities.

In May, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England wrote in a memo, “Because all the combatant commands, military departments and other defense components need the ability to work unhindered in cyberspace, the domain does not fall within the purview of any particular department or component.”

The service originally had decided to establish the Cyber Command as a separate unit within Air Force Space Command, and during the Corona conference, leadership “discussed how the Air Force will continue to develop capabilities in this new domain and train personnel to execute this new mission.”

“The conduct of cyber operations is a complex issue, as [Defense] and other interagency partners have substantial equity in the cyber arena,” Donley said. “We will continue to do our part to increase Air Force cyber capabilities and institutionalize our cyber mission.”

Andrews said the Air Force will provide more details on the Cyber Command later in October after discussions with Pentagon and congressional leadership.

http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10059987-38.html?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20

The most extensive government report to date on whether terrorists can be identified through data mining has yielded an important conclusion: It doesn’t really work.

A National Research Council report, years in the making and scheduled to be released Tuesday, concludes that automated identification of terrorists through data mining or any other mechanism “is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts.” Inevitable false positives will result in “ordinary, law-abiding citizens and businesses” being incorrectly flagged as suspects.

The whopping 352-page report, called “Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists,” amounts to at least a partial repudiation of the Defense Department’s controversial data-mining program called Total Information Awareness, which was limited by Congress in 2003.

But the ambition of the report’s authors is far broader than just revisiting the problems of the TIA program and its successors. Instead, they aim to produce a scholarly evaluation of the current technologies that exist for data mining, their effectiveness, and how government agencies should use them to limit false positives–of the sort that can result in situations like heavily-armed SWAT teams raiding someone’s home and shooting their dogs based on the false belief that they were part of a drug ring.

The report was written by a committee whose members include William Perry, a professor at Stanford University; Charles Vest, the former president of MIT; W. Earl Boebert, a retired senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratories; Cynthia Dwork of Microsoft Research; R. Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle’s police chief; and Daryl Pregibon, a research scientist at Google.

They admit that far more Americans live their lives online, using everything from VoIP phones to Facebook to RFID tags in automobiles, than a decade ago, and the databases created by those activities are tempting targets for federal agencies. And they draw a distinction between subject-based data mining (starting with one individual and looking for connections) compared with pattern-based data mining (looking for anomalous activities that could show illegal activities).

But the authors conclude the type of data mining that government bureaucrats would like to do–perhaps inspired by watching too many episodes of the Fox series 24–can’t work. “If it were possible to automatically find the digital tracks of terrorists and automatically monitor only the communications of terrorists, public policy choices in this domain would be much simpler. But it is not possible to do so.”

A summary of the recommendations:

* U.S. government agencies should be required to follow a systematic process to evaluate the effectiveness, lawfulness, and consistency with U.S. values of every information-based program, whether classified or unclassified, for detecting and countering terrorists before it can be deployed, and periodically thereafter.

* Periodically after a program has been operationally deployed, and in particular before a program enters a new phase in its life cycle, policy makers should (carefully review) the program before allowing it to continue operations or to proceed to the next phase.

* To protect the privacy of innocent people, the research and development of any information-based counterterrorism program should be conducted with synthetic population data… At all stages of a phased deployment, data about individuals should be rigorously subjected to the full safeguards of the framework.

* Any information-based counterterrorism program of the U.S. government should be subjected to robust, independent oversight of the operations of that program, a part of which would entail a practice of using the same data mining technologies to “mine the miners and track the trackers.”

* Counterterrorism programs should provide meaningful redress to any individuals inappropriately harmed by their operation.

* The U.S. government should periodically review the nation’s laws, policies, and procedures that protect individuals’ private information for relevance and effectiveness in light of changing technologies and circumstances. In particular, Congress should re-examine existing law to consider how privacy should be protected in the context of information-based programs (e.g., data mining) for counterterrorism.

By itself, of course, this is merely a report with non-binding recommendations that Congress and the executive branch could ignore. But NRC reports are not radical treatises written by an advocacy group; they tend to represent a working consensus of technologists and lawyers.

The great encryption debate of the 1990s was one example. The NRC’s so-called CRISIS report on encryption in 1996 concluded export controls–that treated software like Web browsers and PGP as munitions–were a failure and should be relaxed. That eventually happened two years later.

Remote Connectivity

Sunday, October 5th, 2008

As you might know, I’m basically a consultant. Sometimes I spend a lot of time at remote client sites. Often my co-workers and I need to communicate. Sure sometimes we can VPN, SSH, or use a Cellular modem but that’s not always practical. Often we use messengers like Gchat or Skype to communicate.

I use to love Gchat/Gmail, but one day Google screwed me and disabled my account. I have no idea why, but I was locked out for a day without any remediation — no number, no email address, no form. Just a lock out. So i dumped Gmail. My address forwards to another account, but that’s it. The problem is my co-workers still love it. But since I’m a security guy on a cruisade I’ve thought of lots of reasons why consultants shouldn’t use Gchat/gmail:

  1. Gmail/Gchat indexes and stores everything
  2. Okay so you click off-the-record — do you think they really stop indexing things?

So you buy that they’re not evil and really don’t store your convo… what is still wrong with GMail/Gchat?

  1. Google sets a cookie to track your username. So all your searches are tracked
  2. This gives away where you are by IP and who your customer is
  3. Gives away the number of consultants working at client side
  4. Gives away when/how-long you’re at the client site

Personally, I’d PAY a LOT for that sort of information on my competitors. But there are still all the tools out there to intercept Gchat… and of course, none of it is encrypted.

I perfer skype. No it’s not perfect, but it’s encrypted, works, and doesn’t (obviously) try to invade my privacy.